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Abstract
We investigate whether the optimal income tax model of Mirrlees (1971) can reproduce the
empirically observed increasing average tax rates. We give a necessary condition and exhibit
two examples where the optimal average tax rates are increasing.
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Since Mirrlees (1971), the main results in the optimal income taxation lit-
erature concern marginal tax rates. This note focuses on average tax rates
(deﬁned as the ratio of taxes minus beneﬁts over gross earnings), a dimen-
sion that has drawn little attention yet. Actually, in most OECD countries,
average tax rates are increasing over the whole income distribution (see
e.g. OECD Tax Database and Immervoll (2004)). This fact is an impor-
tant property to explain since it characterizes the redistributive power of
the tax/beneﬁt system. Our purpose is to investigate whether increasing
average tax rates can be justiﬁed by the optimal income tax model.
Our analysis points out two analytical results. First, an unbounded
distribution function is a necessary condition for increasing optimal average
tax rates. Our argument is therefore complementary to the ones put forward
by Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001) who shed light on the usefulness of an
unbounded distribution function in the analysis of optimal income taxation
problems 1. Second, we emphasize two analytical examples of increasing
average tax rates. These examples are characterized by Pareto unbounded
distribution functions, a maximin social welfare function and quasi-linearity
of the utility function either in consumption (with an isoelastic labor supply)
or in leisure.
2 The general framework
We consider the typical Mirrlees’ (1971) model. It is a one period model
with labor as the only source of income. Individuals diﬀer only in their
exogenous productivity denoted by w ∈ [w,w] with 0 ≤ w < w ≤ +∞. F (.)
denotes the cumulative distribution function of w in the population and
f (.) is its corresponding continuous density. The labor market is perfectly
competitive and the diﬀerent types of labor are perfect substitutes in the
aggregate production function. All the agents have the same utility function
U (C,L) over a single consumption good C and the labor supply L. For the
moment, we only assume that the utility function is “standard”: U (.,.) is
twice diﬀerentiable, strictly quasi-concave and yields UC > 0 and UL < 0.
The government can observe neither agent’s productivity w nor their
labor supply L. Taxes rely thus on before tax earnings Y = w   L. Each
agent takes the tax function T (.) as given when she chooses her labor supply:
L(w) = arg max
L
U (w L − T (w L),L) (1)
1Their argument relies on the properties of the observed income distribution function
and on the observed positive marginal tax rates for top incomes.
1The after-tax utility of agent w is given by:
U (w) ≡ U
￿




where we deﬁne Y (w) ≡ w L(w). Deriving the average tax rates TM (Y ) =
T (Y )/Y with respect to before-tax earnings Y gives:
T′
M (Y ) =
T′ (Y ) − TM (Y )
Y
(2)
where T′ (Y (w)) denotes the marginal tax rate. Therefore, average tax
rates are increasing if and only if marginal tax rates are above average taxes
T′ (Y ) > TM (Y ). The government’s budget constraint writes:
￿ w
w
T (Y (w)) dF (w) ≥ 0 (3)
Since each individual has the same utility function, inequalities are not
due to agent’s responsibility. Therefore, the government wishes to redistrib-
ute income from high to low productive individuals. For the moment we
assume a welfarist and redistributive objective: the government’s objective
is (weakly) increasing in agents’ utility U (w), and gives a higher weight to
less productive agents. These assumptions are consistent with diﬀerent spec-
iﬁcation of the government’s objective, including a “weighted utilitarianism”




a(w)   U (w)   dF (w)
where a(w) is a non-negative and non-increasing function of w, or a maximin
(Rawlsian) objective
W = minU (w)





where Ψ(.) is increasing and concave. The government’s problem consists
in maximizing its objective by choosing the tax schedule T (.) under the
constraint of individual reactions given by (1) and the budget constraint
(3).
The optimal tax schedule emerges from an eﬃciency-equity trade oﬀ.
Consider that the tax schedule has been optimized for all workers up to
type w. A rise in the marginal tax rates of agents of productivity w distorts
their labor supply and generates an eﬃciency loss. However, a rise in this
2marginal tax rate increases the tax level for more productive agents ˜ w > w.
This implies an income transfer from agents of productivity ˜ w > w to agents
of productivity ˆ w ≤ w. Since the formers contribute less to the government’s
objective than the latters, such a shift is positively valued by the government.
This is the equity part of the trade oﬀ. The literature has put forward few
analytical results on tax schedules emerging from this trade oﬀ. Under
weak conditions on preferences 2, it has been shown that (see Seade (1982)
or Werning (2000) for details and derivation) optimal marginal tax rates lie
between 0 and 1 and are not always equal to zero. Henceforth, we assume
that these conditions are veriﬁed.
3 Bounded productivity distribution
In this section we assume the productivity distribution is bounded, so   w <
+∞. In such a case, the optimal marginal tax rate at the top is nil (i.e.
T′ (Y (w)) = 0) since a positive marginal tax rate would have no distrib-
utional eﬀect but would distort eﬃciency. Therefore, we get the following
result:
Proposition 1 If the productivity distribution is bounded, optimal average
tax rates are decreasing close to the top of the distribution function.
Proof. Since marginal tax rates lie between 0 and 1, the maximum level
of tax is T (Y (w)) so from (3) one gets:
T (Y (w)) >
￿ w
w
T (Y (w))dF (w) ≥ 0
Since T′ (Y (w)) = 0, one gets from (2) T′
M (Y (w)) < 0. By continuity, in
the neighborhood of Y (w), one still has T′
M (Y ) < 0.
As a consequence, the optimal tax model is never characterized by an
increasing pattern of average tax rates when the productivity distribution
is bounded. We now turn to the case with unbounded productivity distrib-
ution.
4 Unbounded productivity distribution
In this section, we argue that it is possible to generate analytically increasing
optimal average tax rates in a Mirrlees optimal income tax problem when the
productivity distribution is unbounded. Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001)
argue that an unbounded Pareto distribution represents a good approxi-
mation for the upper part of the productivity distribution in the US. We
2The two weak conditions are the single crossing property (called also the agent
monotonicity condition) and the normality of leisure.
3therefore assume an unbounded Pareto productivity distribution. Hence,
the ratio
1 − F (w)
w f (w)
= p (4)
is henceforth constant, p > 0 denoting this constant. To get closed form
solutions, we make further assumptions. First, we assume that the gov-
ernment has maximin preferences. Second, we analyze alternatively two
popular assumptions on agents’ preferences: quasi-linearity in consumption
and quasi-linearity in leisure.
4.1 Quasi-linear preferences in consumption
Following Diamond (1998), Piketty (1997) and Salanié (2003) we omit the
income eﬀects in the labor supply by considering quasi-linear preferences in
consumption. The utility function writes :
U (C,L) = C − b   L
1+ 1
εL
where εL > 0 stands for the constant wage elasticity of the labor supply
and b > 0 is a normalization parameter. The optimal marginal tax rates
are given by (see e.g. Piketty (1997) or Salanié (2003, pages 84-87) for a
derivation and an interpretation):
T′ (Y (w))








1 − F (w)
w f (w)
Therefore, from (4), the optimal marginal tax rates are constant and posi-
tive, the optimal tax function is linear and writes:
T∗ (Y ) = τ   Y + T0 (5)
and the optimal average tax rate is:
T∗







ε + p(1 + ε)
∈ (0,1)
>From equation (6), average tax rates are therefore increasing if and only
if T0 < 0. Since the marginal tax rate is constant and positive, the function
T (.) is increasing and from the budget constraint (3), one has necessarily
T (0) ≤ T (Y (w)) < 0 < T (Y (w)). Since T0 = T (0), the whole shape of
average tax rate is increasing.
44.2 Quasi-linear preferences in leisure
When preferences are of the form U (C,L) = v(C) − L with v′ (.) > 0
and v′′ (.) < 0, and the government has maximin preferences, the optimal
marginal tax rates are given by (see e.g. Boadway et alii (2000), equation
(18) page 448):
T′ (Y (w)) =
1 − F (w)
w f (w)
Again, under a Pareto productivity distribution, the optimal tax function if
linear of the form (5) and the shape of average tax rate if of the form (6)
with
τ = p ∈ (0,1)
We therefore replicate the preceding argument to get T0 < 0, which implies
that optimal average tax rates are increasing.
Our results are summarized in the following proposition :
Proposition 2 If the productivity distribution is Pareto unbounded, the
government has maximin preferences and agents have a utility function that
is either quasi-linear in consumption (with an isoelastic labor supply) or
quasi-linear in leisure, optimal average tax rates are increasing.
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